Detection of Accounting Anomalies in the Latent Space using Adversarial
  Autoencoder Neural Networks by Schreyer, Marco et al.
Detection of Accounting Anomalies in the Latent Space using
Adversarial Autoencoder Neural Networks
Marco Schreyer
University of St. Gallen
St. Gallen, Switzerland
marco.schreyer@unisg.ch
Timur Sattarov
Deutsche Bundesbank
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
timur.sattarov@bundesbank.de
Christian Schulze
University of St. Gallen
St. Gallen, Switzerland
christian.schulze@unisg.ch
Bernd Reimer
PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH WPG
Stuttgart, Germany
reimer.bernd@pwc.com
Damian Borth
University of St. Gallen
St. Gallen, Switzerland
damian.borth@unisg.ch
ABSTRACT
The detection of fraud in accounting data is a long-standing chal-
lenge in financial statement audits. Nowadays, the majority of
applied techniques refer to handcrafted rules derived from known
fraud scenarios. While fairly successful, these rules exhibit the
drawback that they often fail to generalize beyond known fraud
scenarios and fraudsters gradually find ways to circumvent them. In
contrast, more advanced approaches inspired by the recent success
of deep learning often lack seamless interpretability of the detected
results. To overcome this challenge, we propose the application
of adversarial autoencoder networks. We demonstrate that such
artificial neural networks are capable of learning a semantic mean-
ingful representation of real-world journal entries. The learned
representation provides a holistic view on a given set of journal
entries and significantly improves the interpretability of detected
accounting anomalies. We show that such a representation com-
bined with the networks reconstruction error can be utilized as
an unsupervised and highly adaptive anomaly assessment. Exper-
iments on two datasets and initial feedback received by forensic
accountants underpinned the effectiveness of the approach.
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Company Entry ID Sub-ID Currency Amount D/C Ledger Vendor Customer
AAA 100011 0001 USD 1’000.00 D 1000129 - -
AAA 100011 0002 USD 1’000.00 C 4010111 5890 -
BBB 900124 0001 USD 2’232.00 D 1022001 - 82304
... ... ... ... ... ... … … …
Figure 1: Hierarchical view of an Accounting Information
System (AIS) that records distinct layer of abstractions,
namely (1) the business process, (2) the accounting and (3)
technical journal entry information in designated tables.
1 INTRODUCTION
TheAssociation of Certified Fraud Examiners estimates in its "Global
Study on Occupational Fraud and Abuse 2018" [1] that organiza-
tions lose 5% of their annual revenues due to fraud. The term "fraud"
refers to "the abuse of one’s occupation for personal enrichment
through the deliberate misuse of an organization’s resources or
assets" [48]. A similar study, conducted by the auditors of PwC,
revealed that approx. 30% of the respondents experienced losses
between $100,000 USD and $5 million USD due to fraud [39]. The
study also showed that financial statement fraud caused by far the
highest median loss of the surveyed fraud schemes1.
At the same time, organizations accelerate the digitization of
business processes [32] affecting in particular Accounting Informa-
tion Systems (AIS) or more generally Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) systems. Steadily, these systems collect vast quantities of
business process and accounting data at a granular level. This holds
in particular for the journal entries of an organization recorded in
its general ledger and sub-ledger accounts. SAP, one of the most
prominent enterprise software providers, estimates that approx.
1The ACFE study encompasses an analysis of 2.690 cases of occupational fraud inves-
tigated between January 2016 and October 2017 that occurred in 125 countries. The
PwC study encompasses over 7.228 respondents that experienced economic crime in
the last 24 months.
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77% of the world’s transaction revenue touches one of their ERP
systems [42]. Figure 1 depicts a hierarchical view of an AIS record-
ing process of journal entry information in designated database
tables.
In order to conduct fraud, perpetrators need to deviate from
the regular system usage or posting pattern. Such deviations are
recorded by a very limited number of "anomalous" journal entries
and their respective attribute values. To detect potentially fraud-
ulent activities international audit standards require the direct as-
sessment of such journal entries [2], [19]. Nowadays, auditors and
forensic accountants apply a wide range of data analysis techniques
to examine journal entries during an audit. These techniques often
encompass rule-based analyses referred to as "red-flag" tests (e.g.
postings late at night, multiple vendor bank account changes) as
well as statistical analyses (e.g. Benford’s Law, time series evalua-
tion). Nevertheless, the detection of traces of fraud in up to several
hundred million journal entries remains a labor-intensive task re-
quiring significant time effort and resources.
Driven by the recent technological advances in artificial intel-
ligence [28] deep neural network-based techniques (e.g. deep au-
toencoder neural networks) have emerged into the field of forensic
accounting and financial statement audits [43]. Such, approaches
often lack a seamless interpretability of the detected "anomalous"
journal entries selected for a detailed audit. This is a major draw-
back since auditors are required to test a representative sample of
journal entries in order to reduce the "sampling risk" [20] of an
audit. Ultimately, the testing of an individual entry while ignoring
another one must be defensible in court [17].
To overcome this challenge we propose the application of Adver-
sarial Autoencoder Neural Networks (AAEs) [31]. We demonstrate
that such adversarial architectures are capable of learning a se-
mantic meaningful representation of journal entries. The learned
representation allows for an improved interpretability of the entries
underlying generative processes as well as detected "anomalous"
journal entries. In summary, we present the following contribu-
tions:
• We illustrate that AAEs can be used to learn a representation
of journal entries observable in real-world ERP systems that
partitions the entries into semantic meaningful groups;
• We demonstrate how such a learned representation can be
used by a human auditor or forensic accountant to sample
journal entries for an audit in an interpretable manner;
• We show that the learned representation combined with the
magnitude of an entry’s reconstruction error can be inter-
preted as a highly adaptive anomaly assessment of journal
entries.
We envision this deep learning-based methodology as an impor-
tant supplement to the auditors and forensic accountants toolbox
[36]. The remainder of this work is structured as follows: In Section
2 we provide an overview of the related work. Section 3 follows
with a description of the adversarial autoencoder network archi-
tecture and presents the proposed methodology to detect account-
ing anomalies. The experimental setup and results are outlined in
Section 4 and Section 5. In Section 6 the paper concludes with a
summary of the current work and future directions of research.
An implementation of the proposed methodology is available at
https://github.com/GitiHubi/deepAD.
2 RELATEDWORK
The literature survey presented hereafter focuses on (1) the detec-
tion of fraudulent activities in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
data and (2) the detection of financial fraud using deep Autoencoder
Neural Networks (AENs) [18] as well as Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs) [29].
2.1 Fraud Detection in Accounting Data
The task of detecting fraud and accounting anomalies has been
studied both by practitioners [48] and academia [3]. Several refer-
ences describe different fraud schemes and ways to detect unusual
and "creative" accounting practices [45].
The forensic analysis of journal entries emerged with the advent
of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems and the increased
volume of data recorded by such systems. Bay et al. in [7] use Naive
Bayes methods to identify suspicious general ledger accounts, by
evaluating attributes derived from journal entries measuring any
unusual general ledger account activity. Their approach is enhanced
by McGlohon et al. applying link analysis to identify (sub-) groups
of high-risk general ledger accounts [33]. Kahn et al. in [25] and
[26] create transaction profiles of SAP ERP users. The profiles are
derived from journal entry based user activity pattern recorded
in two SAP R/3 ERP system in order to detect suspicious user
behavior and segregation of duties violations. Similarly, Islam et
al. in [21] use SAP R/3 system audit logs to detect known fraud
scenarios and collusion fraud via a "red-flag" based matching of
fraud scenarios. Debreceny and Gray in [12] analyze dollar amounts
of journal entries obtained from 29 US organizations. In their work,
they search for violations of Benford’s Law [8], anomalous digit
combinations as well as an unusual temporal pattern such as end-
of-year postings. More recently, Poh-Sun et al. in [44] demonstrate
the generalization of the approach by applying it to journal entries
obtained from 12 non-US organizations. Jans et al. in [22] use latent
class clustering to conduct a uni- and multivariate clustering of
SAP ERP purchase order transactions. Transactions significantly
deviating from the cluster centroids are flagged as anomalous and
are proposed for a detailed review by auditors. The approach is
enhanced in [23] by a means of process mining to detect deviating
process flows in an organization procure to pay process. Argyrou
et al. in [4] evaluate self-organizing maps to identify "suspicious"
journal entries of a shipping company. In their work, they calculated
the Euclidean distance of a journal entry and the code-vector of a
self-organizing maps best matching unit. In subsequent work, they
estimate optimal sampling thresholds of journal entry attributes
derived from extreme value theory [5].
Concluding from the reviewed literature, the majority of refer-
ences either draw from accounting and forensic knowledge about
historical fraud schemes or non deep-learning based techniques
to detect financial fraud. However, driven by the recent success of
deep learning techniques, which are potentially misused by fraud-
sters, we see a high demand for auditors to likewise enhance their
examination methodologies.
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Figure 2: The adversarial autoencoder architecture [31], applied to learn the journal entries characteristics and to partition
the entries into semantic meaningful groups. The adversarial autoencoder network architecture imposes an arbitrary prior
distribution p(z) on the discrete latent code vector z, e.g., a mixture of Gaussians. With progressing training the encoder learns
an aggregated posterior distribution дθ (z |x) that matches the imposed prior to fool the discriminator network dϕ .
2.2 Anomaly Detection using Deep Learning
Nowadays, deep learning inspired methods are increasingly used
for novelty and anomaly detection in financial data [10, 37].
Renström and Holmsten in [40] evaluate AENs to detect fraud
in credit card transactions. Similarly, Kazemi and Zarrabi [24] and
Sweers et al. [46] train and evaluate a variety of variational AEN
architectures. Pumsirirat and Yan in [38] compare the anomaly
detection performance of AENs based on three datasets of credit
card transactions. Wedge et al. [47] use AENs to learn behavioral
features from historical credit card transactions. Paula et al. in [35]
use AENs in export controls to detect traces of money laundry and
fraud by analyzing volumes of exported goods. Similarly, Schreyer
et al. in [43] utilized the reconstruction error of deep AENs to detect
anomalous journal entries in two datasets of real-world accounting
data.
More recently, GANs are utilized in the context of fraud detec-
tion. Fiore et al. in [13] train such networks to generate mimicked
anomalies, which were used to augment training data to improve
credit card fraud detection classifiers. Choi et al. in [11] train ensem-
bles of generative models to successfully detect anomalies in credit
card transactions. Zheng et al. in [51] train LSTM-AENs in an adver-
sarial training set up to detect fraudulent credit card transactions.
In another study, Zheng et al. in [50] propose generative denoising
GANs to detect telecommunication fraud in the transactions of two
financial institutions.
To the best of our knowledge, this work presents the first deep-
learning inspired methodology trained in an adversarial training
setup to detect anomalous journal entries in real-world accounting
data.
3 METHODOLOGY
To detect anomalous journal entries one first has to define "normal-
ity" with respect to accounting data. We assume that the majority of
journal entries recorded within an organizations’ ERP system relate
to regular day-to-day business activities. In order to conduct fraud,
perpetrators need to deviate from the "normal". Such a deviating be-
havior will be recorded by a very limited number of journal entries
and their respective attribute values. We refer to journal entries
exhibiting such deviating attribute values as accounting anomalies.
3.1 Accounting Anomaly Classes
When conducting a detailed examination of real-world journal en-
tries, recorded in large-scaled ERP systems, two characteristics can
be observed: First, journal entry attributes exhibit a high variety of
distinct attribute values, e.g., due to the high number of vendors or
distinct posting amounts, and second, journal entries exhibit strong
dependencies between certain attribute values e.g. a document type
that is usually posted in combination with a certain general ledger
account. Derived from this observation and similarly to Breunig et
al. in [9] we distinguish two classes of anomalous journal entries,
namely global and local anomalies:
Global accounting anomalies are journal entries that exhibit
unusual or rare individual attribute values. Such anomalies usually
relate to skewed attributes, e.g., rarely used ledgers, or unusual
posting times. Traditionally, "red-flag" tests performed by auditors
during an annual audit, are designed to capture this type of anomaly.
However, such tests often result in a high volume of false-positive
alerts due to rare but regular events such as reverse postings, provi-
sions and year-end adjustments usually associated with a low fraud
risk [43]. Furthermore, when consulting with auditors and forensic
accountants, "global" anomalies often refer to "error" rather than
"fraud".
Local accounting anomalies are journal entries that exhibit
an unusual or rare combination of attribute values while their
individual attribute values occur quite frequently, e.g., unusual
combinations of general ledger accounts or user accounts used by
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several accounting departments. This type of anomaly is signifi-
cantly more difficult to detect since perpetrators intend to disguise
their activities by imitating a regular activity pattern. As a result,
such anomalies usually pose a high fraud risk since they correspond
to processes and activities that may not be conducted in compliance
with organizational standards.
We aim to learn a model that detects both classes of anomalous
journal entries in an unsupervised manner. Thereby, the learned
model should partitions the population of journal entries into se-
mantic meaningful classes that allows for an increased interpretabil-
ity of the detection results. To achieve this two-fold objective we
utilize Adversarial Autoencoders (AAEs), a deep neural network
architecture introduced by Makhzani et al. [31]. We provide prelim-
inaries of Autoencoder Neural Networks (AENs) and Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) that constitute the AAEs in the fol-
lowing. A more detailed presentation can be found in [15].
3.2 Autoencoder Neural Networks
Formally, letX denote a set ofN journal entries x1,x2, ...,xn , where
each journal entry x i consists of K attributes x i1,x
i
2, ...,x
i
j , ...,x
i
k .
Thereby, x ij denotes the j-th attribute of the i-th journal entry. The
individual attributes x j describe the journal entries accounting spe-
cific details, e.g., the entries fiscal year, posting type, posting date,
amount, general-ledger. Hinton and Salakhutdinov in [18] intro-
duced AENs, a special type of feed-forward multi-layer network
that can be trained to reconstruct its input. Formally, AENs are
comprised of two nonlinear functions referred to as encoder qθ
and decoder pθ network [41]. The encoder function qθ (·) maps the
input x ∈ Rk to a code vector Z ∈ Rm referred to as latent space
representation, where usually k > m. This latent representation is
then mapped back by the decoder function pθ (·) to a reconstruction
xˆ ∈ Rk of the original input space. In an attempt to achieve x ≈ xˆ
the AEN is trained to minimize the dissimilarity of a given journal
entry x i and its reconstruction xˆ i = pθ (qθ (x i )) as faithfully as
possible. Thereby, the training objective is to learn a set of optimal
model parameters θ∗ by minimizing the AENs reconstruction loss,
formally denoted as:
argmin
θ
∥x i − pθ (qθ (x i ))∥. (1)
3.3 Generative Adversarial Neural Networks
Goodfellow et al. introduced GANs in [16], a framework for train-
ing deep generative models using a mini-max game. The objective
is to learn a generator distribution q(x) that matches the real data
distribution pd (x) of journal entries. Instead of trying to explicitly
assign probability to every x i in the data distribution, the GAN aims
to learn a set of parameters θ of a generator network qθ that gener-
ates samples from the generator distribution q(x) by transforming a
noise variable z ∼ pn (z) into a sample qθ (z). Thereby, the generator
is trained by playing against an adversarial discriminator network
dϕ that aims to learn a set of parameters ϕ to distinguish between
samples from the true data distribution pd and the generator’s dis-
tribution q(z). Both networks establish a min-max adversarial game.
A solution to this game can be, expressed as:
min
qθ
max
dϕ
Ex∼pd (x i )[logdϕ (x i )] + Ez∼pn (zi )[log(1 − dϕ (qθ (zi ))].
(2)
3.4 Adversarial Autoencoders
The AAE architecture, as illustrated in Fig. 2, extends the concept
of AEN by imposing an arbitrary prior on the AENs latent space
using a GAN training setup [31]. This is achieved by training the
AAE jointly in two phases (1) a reconstruction phase as well as (2)
an adversarial regularization phase.
In the reconstruction phase, the AAEs encoder network qθ (z |x)
is trained to learn an aggregated posterior distribution q(z) of the
journal entriesX over the latent code vectorZ . Thereby, the learned
posterior distribution corresponds to a compressed representation
of the journal entry characteristics. Similarly to AENs, the decoder
network pθ (xˆ |z) of the AAE utilizes the learned latent code vector
representations Z to reconstruct the journal entries Xˆ as faithfully
as possible to minimize the AAEs reconstruction error.
In the regularization phase, an adversarial training setup is ap-
plied were the encoder network qθ (z |x) of the AAE functions as
the generator network. In addition, a discriminator network dϕ (z)
is attached on top of the learned latent code vector Z . Similarly to
GANs, the discriminator network of the AAE is trained to distin-
guish samples of an imposed prior distribution p(z) onto Z from the
learned aggregated posterior distribution q(z). In contrast, the en-
coder network is trained to learn a posterior distributionp(z) ≈ q(z)
that fools the discriminator network into thinking that the samples
drawn from q(z) originate from the imposed prior distribution p(z).
3.5 Accounting Anomaly Detection
In order, to detect interpretable accounting anomalies in real-world
ERP datasets we propose a novel anomaly score utilizing the in-
troduced AAE architecture. The score builds on the regularisation
applied throughout the AAE training process, namely the recon-
struction error loss, denoted by Eq. (1), and the adversarial loss,
denoted by Eq. (2), described in the following.
The reconstruction loss promotes the AAE to learn a set of non-
overlapping latent journal entry representation. However, this may
result in a highly "fractured" latent space in which deviating repre-
sentations are learned for similar journal entries. The additionally
applied adversarial loss prevents the fracturing problem. It forces
the learned representations z to reside within the high probability
density regions of the imposed prior distribution p(z). To partition
the latent space into semantic regions we impose a multi-modal
prior, e.g., a mixture of Gaussians. Thereby, the interaction of both
regularising losses forces the AAE to learn groups of semantic sim-
ilar journal entries located in close spatial proximity to the modes
of the imposed prior.
As a result, the AAE learns with progressing training, a model
that disentangles the underlying generative processes of journal
entries in the latent space z. Each group of learned representations
corresponds to a distinct generative process of journal entries, e.g.,
depreciation postings or vendor payment postings. To detect po-
tential accounting anomalies, we investigate the individual entries
of each group in terms of potential "violations" of one of the two
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Figure 3: Exemplary distribution of the ’account key’ (technically: ’KTOSL’) attribute values (left), the log-normalized ’local’
and ’foreign currency amount’ (technically: ’DMBTR’ and ’WRBTR’) attribute values (center), as well as the ’posting key’
(technically: ’BSCHL’) and ’general ledger account’ (technically: ’HKONT’) (right) observable in Dataset B.
applied regularising losses. We hypothesize, that anomalous journal
entries can be captured by either (1) their latent divergence from
the modes of the imposed prior or (2) an increased reconstruction
error. Thereby, the type of violation also reveals the anomaly class
of the investigated entry, as described in the following:
Mode Divergence (MD): Journal entries that exhibit anoma-
lous attribute values (global anomalies) result in an increased di-
vergence from the imposed multi-modal prior, e.g., as in this work
the divergence to the modes of an imposed mixture of multivariate
isotropic Gaussians N(µ,I), where µ ∈ Rm defines the τ modes
of the distinct Gaussians denoted by µ = {µ1 . . . µτ }. Throughout
the AAE training, the entries will be "pushed" towards the high
probability density regions of the prior by the regularization. In
order to be able to discriminate between the imposed prior and
the learned aggregated posterior the AAE aims to keep the ma-
jority of the entries within the high-density regions (modes) of
the prior. In contrast, representations that correspond to rare or
anomalous journal entries will tend to differ from the imposed
modes and be placed in the priors low-density regions. We use
this characteristic and obtain an entry’s x i mode divergence D as
the Euclidean distance of the entry’s learned representation zi to
its closest mode µτ . Formally, we derive the mode divergence as
denoted by Dτθ ∗ (zi ; µ) = minτ ∥z
i − µτ ∥2 under optimal model pa-
rameters θ∗. Finally, we calculate the normalized mode divergence
MD as expressed by:
MDτθ ∗ (x i ) =
Dτθ ∗ (zi ; µ) − Dτθ ∗,min
Dτθ ∗,max − Dτθ ∗,min
, (3)
where Dmin and Dmax denotes the min- and max-values of the
obtained mode divergences given by Dθ ∗ and closest mode τ .
Reconstruction Error (RE): Journal entries that exhibit anoma-
lous attribute value co-occurrences (local anomalies) tend to re-
sult in an increased reconstruction error [43]. This is caused by
the compression capability of the AAE architecture. Anomalous
and therefore unique attribute co-occurrences exhibit an increased
probability of getting lost in the encoders "lossy" compression. As a
result, their low dimensional representation will overlap with regu-
lar entries in the latent space and are not reconstructed correctly
by the decoder. Formally, we obtain the reconstruction error E of
each entry x i and its reconstruction xˆ i as the squared-difference
denoted by Eτθ ∗ (x i ; xˆ i ) = 1k
∑k
j=1 (x ij − xˆ ij )
2 under optimal model
parameters θ∗. Finally, we calculate the normalized reconstruction
error RE as expressed by:
REτθ ∗ (x i ; xˆ i ) =
Eτθ ∗ (x i ; xˆ i ) − Eτθ ∗,min
Eτθ ∗,max − Eτθ ∗,min
, (4)
where Emin and Emax denotes the min- and max-values of the
obtained reconstruction errors given by Eθ ∗ and closest mode τ .
Anomaly Score (AS): Quantifying both characteristics for a
given journal entry, we can reasonably conclude (1) if the entry is
anomalous and (2) if it was created by a "regular" business activ-
ity. To detect global and local accounting anomalies in real-world
audit scenarios we propose to score each journal entry x i by its
normalized reconstruction error RE regularized and normalized
mode divergenceMD given by:
ASτ (x i ; xˆ i ) = α × REτθ ∗ (x i ; xˆ i ) + (1 − α) ×MDτθ ∗ (x i ), (5)
for each individual journal entry x i and optimal model parameters
θ∗ and closest mode τ . We introduce α as a factor to balance both
characteristics.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we describe the experimental setup and model train-
ing. We evaluate the anomaly detection performance of the pro-
posed scoring based on two datasets of journal entries.
4.1 Datasets and Data Preparation
In general, SAP ERP systems record journal entries and their cor-
responding attributes predominantly in two database tables: (1)
the table "Accounting Document Headers" (technically: "BKPF")
contains the meta-information of a journal entry, such as document
id, type, date, time, or currency, while (2) the table "Accounting Doc-
ument Segments" (technically: "BSEG") contains the entry details,
such as posting key, general ledger account, debit-credit informa-
tion, or posting amount. In the context of this work, we extract a
subset of the most discriminative journal entry attributes of the
"BKPF" and "BSEG" table.
In our experiments we use two datasets of journal entries: a
real-world and a synthetic dataset referred to as dataset A and
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Figure 4: Exemplary AAE latent space distribution of dataset B with progressing network training: imposed prior distribution
p(z) consisting of a mixture of τ = 10 Gaussians (left), learned aggregated posterior distribution дθ (z |x) after 100 training
epochs (center), learned aggregated posterior distribution дθ (z |x) after 2,000 training epochs (right).
dataset B in the following. Dataset A is an extract of an SAP ERP
instance and encompasses the entire population of journal entries
of a single fiscal year2. Dataset B is an excerpt of the synthetic
dataset presented in [30]3. The majority of attributes recorded
in ERP systems correspond to categorical (discrete) variables, e.g.
posting date, account, posting type, currency. We pre-process the
categorical journal entry attributes to obtain a binary ("one-hot"
encoded) representation of each journal entry.
To allow for a detailed analysis and quantitative evaluation of
the experiments we inject a small fraction of synthetic global and
local anomalies into both datasets. Similar to real audit scenarios
this results in a highly unbalanced class distribution of anomalous
vs. regular day-to-day entries. The injected global anomalies con-
sist of attribute values not evident in the original data while the
local anomalies exhibit combinations of attribute value subsets not
occurring in the original data. The true labels are available for both
datasets. Each journal entry is labeled as either (1) synthetic global
anomaly, (2) synthetic local anomaly or (3) non-synthetic regular
entry. The following descriptive statistics summarize both datasets:
• Dataset A: contains a total of 307, 457 journal entry line
items comprised of six categorical and two numerical at-
tributes. The encoding resulted in a total of 401 encoded
dimensions for each entry x i ∈ R401; and, In total 95 (0.03%)
synthetic anomalous journal entries have been injected into
the dataset. These entries encompass 55 (0.016%) global
anomalies and 40 (0.015%) local anomalies.
• Dataset B: contains a total of 533, 009 journal entry line
items comprised of six categorical and two numerical at-
tributes. The encoding resulted in a total of 618 encoded di-
mensions for each entry x i ∈ R618. In total 100 (0.018%) syn-
thetic, anomalous journal entries have been injected into the
2In compliance with strict data privacy regulations, all journal entry attributes of
dataset A have been anonymized using an irreversible one-way hash function during
the data extraction process. To ensure data completeness, the journal entry based
general ledger balances were reconciled against the standard SAP trial balance reports
e.g. the SAP ’RFBILA00’ report.
3The original dataset is publicly available via the Kaggle predictive modeling and
analytics competitions platform and can be obtained using the following link:
https://www.kaggle.com/ntnu-testimon/paysim1.
dataset. These entries encompass 70 (0.013%) global anom-
alies and 30 (0.005%) local anomalies.
Figure 3 illustrates an exemplary distribution of the attributes
primarily investigated during and audit, namely the ’account key’
(technically: ’KTOSL’) attribute values, the log-normalized ’local’
and ’foreign currency amount’ (technically: ’DMBTR’ and ’WRBTR’)
attribute values, as well as the ’posting key’ (technically: ’BSCHL’)
and ’general ledger account’ (technically: ’HKONT’) observable in
Dataset B.
4.2 Adversarial Autoencoder Training
Our architectural setup follows the AAE architecture [31] as shown
in Fig. 2, comprised of three distinct neural networks that are trained
in parallel. The encoder network qθ uses Leaky Rectified Linear
Unit (LReLU) activation functions [49] except in the last "bottle-
neck" layer. Both the decoder network pθ and the discriminator dϕ
network use LReLUs in all layers except the output layers where
a Sigmoid activation function is used. Table 1 depicts the architec-
tural details of the networks which are implemented using PyTorch
[34].
Training stability is a main challenge in adversarial training [6]
and we face a variety of collapsing and non-convergence scenarios.
To determine a stable training setup we sweep the learning rates
of the encoder and decoder networks through the interval η ∈
[10−05, 10−02], and the learning rates of the discriminator network
through the interval η ∈ [10−07, 10−03]. Ultimately, we use the
following constant learning rates to learn a stable model of each
dataset:
• Dataset A: η = 10−4 for the encoder and the decoder net-
work, η = 10−5 for the discriminator network; and,
• Dataset B: η = 10−3 for the encoder and the decoder net-
work, η = 10−5 for the discriminator network.
We train the AAE with mini-batch wise SGD for max. 10,000
training epochs and apply early stopping once the reconstruction
loss converges. In accordance with [49] we set the scaling factor
of the LReLUs to α = 0.4 and initialized the AAE parameters as
described in [14]. A mini-batch size of 128 journal entries is used
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Table 1: Neurons per layer ℓ of the distinct networks that
comprise the AAE architecture [31]: encoder qθ , decoder pθ
and discriminator dϕ neural network.
Net Dataset ℓ = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
qθ (z |x ) A 256 128 64 32 16 8 4 2
pθ (xˆ |z) A 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256
dϕ (z) A 128 64 32 16
qθ (z |x ) B 256 64 16 4 2 - - -
pθ (xˆ |z) B 2 4 16 64 256 - - -
dϕ (z) B 256 64 16 4 1 - - -
in both the reconstruction and the regularization phase. We use
Adam optimization [27] and set β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999 in the op-
timization of the network parameters. In the reconstruction phase,
we use a combined loss function Lθ to optimize the encoder qθ
and decoder net pθ parameters. For each journal entry we calculate
(1) the cross-entropy reconstruction error LCEθ of the categorical
attribute value encodings x icat , e.g., the encoded general ledger
account id, and (2) the mean-squared reconstruction error LMSEθ
of the numerical attribute value encodings x icon , e.g., the encoded
posting amount, formally expressed by:
Lθ (x i ; xˆ i ) = γ LCEθ (x icat ; xˆ icat ) + (1 − γ ) LMSEθ (x icon ; xˆ icon ) (6)
were the parameter γ balances both losses. In this initial work, we
setγ = 23 in all our experiments to account for the higher amount of
categorical attributes in both datasets. In the regularization phase,
we calculate the adversarial loss, according to equation 2, when
optimizing the parameters of the discriminator dϕ .
To partition the learned journal entry representations, we sample
from a prior distribution p(z) comprised of a mixture of τ multi-
variate isotropic Gaussians N(µ,I), where µ ∈ R2. Thereby, τ is
a hyperparameter we evaluate when sampling of τ ∈ {5, 10, 15}
Gaussians. Figure 4 shows an exemplary prior consisting of τ = 10
Gaussians as well as the learned aggregated posterior distributions
after 100 and 2,000 training epochs.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first assess the semantic partitioning of the
journal entries by the imposed prior distributions. Afterward, we
examine the anomalies detected of each semantic partition.
Semantic partitioning:Wequalitatively review the latent space
partitioning of the journal entries and assess the accounting spe-
cific semantics that is learned by each mode. Figure 5 shows the
partitioning result of dataset A, where τ = 5 Gaussians (see appxs.
for results of varying τ and dataset B). It can be observed that the
AAE learned a rather clean separation of the regular journal entries.
The review of the journal entries accounting specific semantics
captured by each mode and dataset revealed:
• Dataset A: The entries of each partition exhibit a high se-
mantic similarity while each partition corresponds to a gen-
eral accounting process, such as (1) automated payment run
entries postings, (2) outgoing customer invoices, and (3) ma-
terial movements.
• Dataset B: Similarly, the entries of each partition exhibit a
high semantic similarity and correspond to the following
general accounting processes (1) foreign and domestic in-
voice postings, (2) purchase of goods, (3) manual payments.
The experimental results when imposing τ ∈ {5, 10, 15} Gaus-
sians on the latent space of each dataset are presented in the ap-
pendix of this work. The results show that the AAE is capable
of learning a semantic partition of a given set of journal entries
according to that disentangles the entries underlying generative
processes. The learned partition provides the auditor a holistic view
on a given set of accounting data subject to audit. Furthermore,
it allows to effectively obtain a representative and interpretable
sample of the data and thereby reduces the audits sampling risk.
Table 2: Mean anomaly score AS obtained per journal entry
class and α = 0.8 by imposing a prior distribution consisting
of τ = 5 (10, and 15) mixture of Gaussians and training the
AAE for 5,000 (10,000, and 15,000) epochs (variances origi-
nate from the distinct parameter initialization seeds).
Class Data AS , τ = 5 AS , τ = 10 AS , τ = 15
global A 0.295 ± 0.233 0.448 ± 0.207 0.532 ± 0.244
local A 0.248 ± 0.276 0.275 ± 0.143 0.446 ± 0.202
regular A 0.045 ± 0.076 0.053 ± 0.085 0.110 ± 0.034
global B 0.508 ± 0.249 0.442 ± 0.245 0.437 ± 0.241
local B 0.357 ± 0.260 0.164 ± 0.148 0.273 ± 0.228
regular B 0.046 ± 0.061 0.070 ± 0.041 0.028 ± 0.029
Anomaly detection: In addition, we analyze the anomaly de-
tection capability of the proposed anomaly score. Table 2 depicts
the mean anomaly scoreAS obtained for each journal entry class by
imposing a prior distribution consisting of τ ∈ {5, 10, 15}mixture of
Gaussians and training the AAE for 5,000 epochs. The quantitative
results show the distinct journal entry classes (global, local, and reg-
ular entries) can be distinguished according to their anomaly score
in both datasets. Figure 5 exemplary shows the anomaly scores
obtained for dataset A (see appxs. for results of dataset B) of each
journal entry and corresponding partition τ as well as the distribu-
tion of the obtained individual anomaly scores. Figure 6 illustrates
the change in anomaly scoring when varying the α parameter of the
AS . It can be observed that increasing α (and therefore the weight
on the reconstruction error of the score) improves the ability to
detect local accounting anomalies in the dataset.
We also qualitatively evaluate the characteristics of the anom-
alies detected in each partition. Therefore, we review journal entries
that correspond to a high anomaly score but have not been synthet-
ically injected as anomalies into the evaluated datasets. Thereby,
we interpret the detected anomalies of each mode τ in the context
of the modes regular entries:
• Global anomalies exhibit a low semantic similarity to the
regular entries of a mode. The detected entries correspond
to rarely observable attribute values and accounting "ex-
ceptions"’, e.g., unusual purchase order amounts or high
depreciation, year-end as well as impairment postings.
• Local anomalies exhibit high semantic similarity to the
regular entries of a mode. The detected entries correspond
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Figure 5: Learned AAE latent space representations of the journal entries contained in dataset A after training the AAE for
5,000 epochs and imposing amixture of τ = 5Gaussians (left), the anomaly scoresAS obtained for α = 0.8 of each journal entry
xi and corresponding mode µτ (center), the anomaly score distribution (bold line defines the median, upper and lower bound
define the 0.05 and 0.95 quantile of the distribution) obtained of each journal entry class with progressing network training
(right).
Figure 6: Anomaly scores AS obtained by the application of distinct RE vs. MD balance factors α after training the AAE for
5,000 epochs on dataset A (see appxs. for results of varying τ and dataset B) and imposing a mixture of τ = 5 Gaussians. It can
be observed that decreasing α results in an improved detection of global anomalies (left). In contrast, increasing α results in
an improved detection of local anomalies (right).
to rarely observable attribute value combinations, e.g., sys-
tem users that switched departments, postings exhibiting
unusual general ledger account combinations.
In summary, these results lead us to conclude that the proposed
anomaly score can be utilized as a highly adaptive anomaly as-
sessment of financial accounting data. It furthermore provides the
ability to interpret the detected anomalies of a particular mode in
the context of the modes regular journal entry semantics. Initial
feedback received by auditors on the detected anomalies under-
pinned not only their relevance from an accounting perspective.
6 SUMMARY
In this work, we showed that Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE) neural
networks can be trained to learn a semantic meaningful represen-
tation of journal entries recorded in real-world ERP systems. We
also provided initial evidence that such representations provide a
holistic view of the entries and disentangle the underlying genera-
tive processes. We believe that the presented approach enables a
human auditor or forensic accountant with the ability to sample
journal entries for a detailed audit in an interpretable manner and
therefore reduce the "sampling risk". In addition, we proposed a
novel anomaly score that combines and entry’s learned representa-
tion and reconstruction error. We demonstrated that the scoring
can be interpreted as a highly adaptive and unsupervised anomaly
assessment to detect global and accounting anomalies.
We plan to conduct a more detailed investigation of the jour-
nal entries’ latent space disentanglement. Given the tremendous
amount of journal entries annually recorded by organizations, an
automated semantic disentanglement improves the transparency
of entries to be audited and can save auditors considerable time.
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APPENDIX
Experimental Results - Dataset A
Figure 7: Learned AAE latent space representations of the journal entries contained in dataset A after training the AAE for
10,000 epochs and imposing a mixture of τ = 10 Gaussians (left), the anomaly scores AS obtained for α = 0.8 of each journal
entry xi and corresponding mode µτ (center), the anomaly score distribution (bold line defines the median, upper and lower
bound define the 0.05 and 0.95 quantile of the distribution) obtained of each journal entry class with progressing training
(right).
Figure 8: Learned AAE latent space representations of the journal entries contained in dataset A after training the AAE for
15,000 epochs and imposing a mixture of τ = 15 Gaussians (left), the anomaly scores AS obtained for α = 0.8 of each journal
entry xi and corresponding mode µτ (center), the anomaly score distribution (bold line defines the median, upper and lower
bound define the 0.05 and 0.95 quantile of the distribution) obtained of each journal entry class with progressing training
(right). It can be observed, based on the anomaly scores obtained with progressing training of mode τ = 12, that mode stability
wasn’t reached entirely after training the AAE for 15,000 epochs.
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Experimental Results - Dataset B
Figure 9: Learned AAE latent space representations of the journal entries contained in dataset B after training the AAE for
5,000 epochs and imposing a mixture of τ = 5, 10 and 20 Gaussians (top to bottom) (left), the anomaly scores AS obtained for
α = 0.8 of each journal entry xi and corresponding mode µτ (center), the anomaly score distribution (bold line defines the
median, upper and lower bound define the 0.05 and 0.95 quantile of the distribution) obtained of each journal entry class with
progressing training (right).
